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Abstract We model knowledge diffusion in a population of agents situated on a
network, interacting only over direct ties. Some agents are by nature traders, others
are by nature “givers”: traders demand a quid pro quo for information transfer; givers
do not. We are interested in efficiency of diffusion and explore the interplay between the
structure of the population (proportion of traders), the network structure (clustering,
path length and degree distribution), and the scarcity of knowledge. We find that at
the global level, trading (as opposed to giving) reduces efficiency. At the individual
level, highly connected agents do well when knowledge is scarce, agents in clustered
neighbourhoods do well when it is abundant. The latter finding is connected to the
debate on structural holes and social capital.
1 Introduction
This paper examines the relationship between the architecture of an industrial R&D
network and efficiency in knowledge distribution, both from the point of view of
individual firm performance, and at the level of the system.
Recent technological changes have had the effect of creating multi-product firms:
the knowledge base on which both production and innovation are founded has, in
general, become much broader, covering more, and different types of knowledge
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(Granstrand and Sjolander 1990). As a consequence, firms increasingly discover that
their in-house knowledge is not sufficient for efficient production or innovation. This
had driven them to seek the knowledge they need outside, in other firms. However,
and precisely due to the nature of knowledge, this task is difficult to achieve through
pure market interaction. Thus, firms are now forming relatively long term alliances,
formal and informal, with other, often competing, firms. This has led to the networ-
ked organization, a hybrid organizational form lying between the market and a pure
hierarchy (Powell 1990), which takes advantage of both market and non-market inter-
actions. Networks supply firms with rapid, flexible access to resources outside their
core competencies. Strong, stable contacts with other firms can provide a firm with
the knowledge it needs for its immediate production or innovation without navigating
the difficulties of market transactions for knowledge. In addition, contacts of this type
can also provide a form of insurance—giving a firm rapid access to information about
developments taking place in other firms or related industries. These observations are
particularly relevant to knowledge-intensive, and science-based industries.
There is now a large literature, much located in the management field, examining the
structural properties of innovation or R&D networks. Three properties recur. Networks
tend to be sparse. That is, of the total possible connections between agents, the actual
connections constitute a small proportion. Networks tend to be locally dense. Local
clusters of closely interconnected agents are common. In addition though, the local
clusters tend to be only sparsely connected to each other. Finally, the distribution of
links over agents tends to be highly skewed. It is probably too strong to say there
is common evidence of power law distributions, but relatively heavy tails do exist.
The discussion in the literature concerns how these properties arise, and how firms’
performance is affected by them.
As to the relationship between network position and performance, there are roughly
speaking two competing views. On the one hand, following Coleman (1988), it is
possible to argue that dense sub-groups are a source of social capital.1 A group of
highly inter-connected agents generates trust, common languages and problem-solving
heuristics, social disapprobation for opportunistic behaviour and so on. If firms i and
j are linked, they can share information about a common partner k. This reduces
significantly the incentives for k to behave opportunistically against, j , even if he will
never see j again, since information about his behaviour will travel rapidly to i and to
all the other members of the clique. More positively, if i is working on a problem, using
information gathered from j and k, or in discussion with j and k, an ability of j and
k to discuss the problem with each other, or exchange information about it, can only
have a positive effect on i’s ability to solve his problem. These considerations imply
that structurally embedded partnerships will be important sources of value for a firm,
and redundant links are privately, and probably also socially valuable.2 Thus for a firm,
a useful link formation strategy is to close open triangles, and create strong cliques.
1 See also Walker et al. 1997 on the same subject.
2 The third link that closes a triangle can be seen as redundant since its effect is simply to create a path
of length one between two agents where a path of length 2 already existed. Notice here that “redundant” is
only strongly applicable if this reduction in path length serves no purpose, that is, if in general path lengths
are not (privately) important.
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The value of this strategy is observed in empirical studies by Dyer and Nobeoka (2000),
on the automobile industry; Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) in a study of alliance formation
in several industries; Powell et al. (1996) who study the impact of network position
on innovation performance in the biotechnology sector; and Rowley et al. (2000) in a
study of strong and weak ties in innovation networks in the steel and semiconductor
industries.
On the other hand, Burt (1992) argues that dense local links are redundant in a
strong sense, that the existence of structural holes in a firm’s ego network is efficient,
and that locally dense networks can be a source of rigidity. A structural hole exists if
two of my neighbours are not linked to each other. Through these two neighbours I
am connected to different parts of the larger network, and thus have access to different
sources of dispersed information. Thus if a firm is to form a new link, closing a
structural hole is less valuable than finding a partner to whom none of my current
partners is currently connected. This is closely related to the argument of Podolny
(1993), that firms attempt to increase their betweenness centrality. If many shortest
paths between firms go through firm i , then i can exert considerable control over
knowledge flows. Particularly in the knowledge economy, control of knowledge flows
can be translated into rents. This is an argument that clique spanning ties are valuable.
The value of structural holes has been examined empirically by, for example, Ahuja
(2000) in the context of the international chemical industry (structural holes have
a negative impact on industry performance, whereas indirect and direct ties have a
positive impact on firm innovative performance); Gargiulo and Bennassi (2000) who
find in a study of an Italian IT firm that dense local networks do not respond well
to change (they find a trade-off associated with the safety conferred by cohesive ties
(social capital) and the flexibility conferred by ties that connect different parts of a
network); Baum et al. (2003) study the sources of inter-clique link formation in the
Canadian merchant banking industry.
This debate between social capital and structural holes is formalised through the
notion of clustering. An agent’s ego network is clustered if many of its partners are
partners of each other. The structural holes argument claims that a highly clustered ego
network is bad for performance; the social capital position argues the opposite. At an
aggregate level, individual clustering levels can be averaged to describe an industry (or
sector or economy) network. By extension, the structural holes argument implies that
unclustered networks will perform well, whereas the social capital position argues that
locally dense networks, which by definition are highly clustered, will perform well.
One way in which these positions are sometimes reconciled (see for example Rowley
et al. 2000) is that they apply to different moments in an industry life cycle. When
an industry is young, technologies are being explored, and many different avenues of
advance are potentially fruitful. Here, it is important to have rapid access to “distant”
(both in geographical and technological space) information. Thus redundant ties are
less valuable than ties that connect to different parts of the network. Structural holes are
desirable. However, in a more mature industry, there are fewer technological surprises,
so exploitation is more common. Here, a dense core of agents addressing similar issues
creates the critical mass that is necessary to make further progress along the chosen
path. Social capital becomes more valuable.
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While clustering has received much attention in the literature, there is a second
aspect of structure that is now considered important. This is the distribution of edges
over nodes, and in particular the extent to which this distribution is skewed, with
a few nodes having many links and the majority having few. Though the skewness
of the degree distribution is relatively well established (see Powell et al. 2005 for
example), its implications for R&D networks are not well understood. The genesis
of a skewed distribution lies in some form of “preferential attachment”: firms with
many existing links are likely to be valuable partners, and so attract more links. On the
face of it, this is intuitively appealing, since a large number of partnerships indicates
that a firm both has useful knowledge and knows how to collaborate. But a skewed
distribution implies the presence of stars in the network—agents through whom many
(short) paths run. Consequently, while this structure is robust to random failures (since
the failure of a randomly selected node affects most likely affects only a few other
nodes), it is very fragile to specific failures (if a star fails, many other nodes, and
paths between many pairs of nodes, are affected). Stars in a network can serve as
important centres of knowledge distribution, and so a highly skewed network may be
conducive to very rapid diffusion of knowledge. On the other hand, though, if a star
ceases to participate in the system for some reason, this can cause a serious disruption
in the distribution system, and if the situation is such that agents withdraw from the
system from time to time (for whatever reason) a flatter link distribution may be
preferable.
While network structure will clearly have an effect on the efficiency of diffusion,
structure may interact with the micro-specifics of exchange. The transmission of know-
ledge, particularly among competing firms, is a challenge for economists, especially
if there is no market for knowledge. Two patterns of transmission have been obser-
ved empirically. Allen (1983) describes “collective invention” in which knowledge is
given away as a (local) gift. In the steel industry in Cleveland UK in the mid nineteenth
century, for example, steel producers met regularly under the auspices of societies
like the Cleveland Institute of Engineers, the South Wales Institution of Engineers
or the national Iron and Steel Institute and disclosed their own recent technological
developments. As a producer made an advance in furnace height or temperature, for
example, that producer would document the change—how it was accomplished, the
technical effects and so on—and present this to other local firms. Knowledge was
essentially given away to competitors within the local cluster, and as a consequence,
the technology developed rapidly.3 von Hippel (1987) on the other hand documents a
barter exchange. Technical managers of steel mini-mills in the US exchange technical
information and explicitly help each other solve problems.4 But here the transfer is
not a gift: there is a quid pro quo. While the interaction is not market-based, there are
social sanctions if an agent routinely receives but does not give knowledge. In essence,
3 McGaw (1987) finds a similar pattern in paper manufacturing in New England in the early 1880s, and
Lamoureaux (1999) cites other examples from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the US.
4 von Hippel also found the same phenomenon in aerospace and waferboard industries. Powell et al. (1996)
document a similar phenomenon in biotech.
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knowledge is bartered. In both of these cases, knowledge transmission is local, taking
place in face-to-face interactions. If this represents the nature of knowledge diffusion,
then the structure of local interactions will play a central role in the process through
which a “piece of knowledge” moves from one geographic location to another, or more
generally how it diffuses throughout an economy.5
These are the issues we take up in this paper. We are interested in how the archi-
tecture of the communication network affects its performance in terms of knowledge
distribution. This relationship may change, however, depending on the details of the
transmission mechanism. The model we construct below permits us to examine both
architecture and transmission as variables controlling knowledge diffusion.
2 The model
In general, for any agent, more knowledge is better from the point of view of producing
goods, and the communication network is the infrastructure over which agents acquire
the knowledge they need in order to produce.
To capture this, we model a world in which there is a fixed, finite population
of agents, and a fixed, finite number of ideas relevant to production. An agent is
characterised by two properties: the set of ideas he has, and his production goal.
Production is controlled by a Leontieff production function for which only a small
number of ideas is necessary, different agents having different production functions.
Production is done in isolation, but demands that an agent possesses all the ideas that
are relevant to his productive activity, i.e. the ideas for which his production function
has non zero coefficients. If one or more ideas are missing, they can be acquired via
an agent’s acquaintances. Thus the set of ideas held by any agent evolves over time,
and we shall assume this takes place through a simple process of one-to-one exchange
or gift.
Ideas have the feature that agents do not lose by giving. Thus it might be argued
that agents could well give without asking for reciprocity. If agents have to compete in
a second step, however, even though an agent’s knowledge level does not decrease by
giving away ideas, his competitive position might. Different industrial contexts will
display different “terms of trade”. In the present paper, we will consider a world of
knowledge traders, a world of knowledge givers, and a mixed situation in which both
co-exist.
2.1 Network structure
Let G(V, N ) be the undirected graph representing the industry network, with V =
{1, . . . , n} the set of agents and N = {Ni , i ∈ S} the correspondence specifying, for
each i ∈ V, the neighbourhood Ni of i. The degree of firm i is the number of direct
5 For models examining the relationship between network structure and knowledge diffusion see Cowan
and Jonard (2003) on the gift economy, and Cowan and Jonard (2004) on a barter economy.
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ties of that firm
ni = #Ni .
Average degree in the network is then n = ∑i∈V ni/n. Any j ∈ Ni is at distance 1
from i. Indirect ties connect i to individuals at a distance strictly more than one.
Define di j the distance between i and j , as the number of edges in the shortest path,






and average distance (characteristic path length) is d = ∑i∈V di/n.
An additional measure of the structure of local links is clustering. The extent to
which i’s neighbourhood is clustered is measured by
ci = 2




where ξ jl = 1 if j ∈ Nl and ξ jl = 0 otherwise. This statistic measures the proportion
of existing triangles among those which could involve i, given ni . The clustering
coefficient for the network as a whole is c = ∑i∈V ci/n. Though more sophisticated
measures of structural position can be designed, for our purpose the distribution and
organization of direct and direct ties as captured by degree, clustering and distance
are sufficient.
In order to examine the relationship between structure and performance, we create
an algorithm to construct a family of random graphs derived from an ordered substrate.
As a first step, consider the re-wiring algorithm from Watts and Strogatz (1998) that
has as a control parameter the probability p that a link in a periodic lattice is randomly
rewired. Start from the periodic lattice with an even number m of nearest neighbours
(ni = m, for all i ∈ V ) and sequentially consider each edge, making a decision of
uniform random rewiring (with probability p) or preservation (probability 1 − p). As
p increases the regular periodic lattice (p = 0) is left and through intermediate states
(0 < p < 1) a random graph with uniform degree is reached (p = 1). This procedure
creates a small amount of variation in individual degree ni and an average degree of
m is preserved as the total number of edges is kept constant (it is exactly equal to
nm/2, half the degree sum). We know from Watts and Strogatz (1998) that there is an
interval (the small world region) over which clustering remains high while path length
has fallen close to the level of a random graph of average degree m. Indeed, when the
number of random links is small the removal of a few of them has a strong effect on
average path length while it has only little effect on the clustering coefficient.
Besides clustering and path length, we are interested in the effect of asymmetry
in the degree distribution. There has been extensive debate (see for instance Barabási
and Albert 1999) about scale-free networks (that is, networks with a power law degree
distribution having exponent between 2 and 3) and the extent to which they can be
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found in empirical data. Scale-free networks and power law distribution in general
are not our interest here. Rather, we will simply explore the effect of having stars
in the system, in addition to the possibility of having more or less clustered random
structures. We do this the following way. Assume now there are two classes of agents:
s stars with degree di = D for i ∈ S ⊆ V, and n − s non-stars with degree d ≤ D.
The problem is now to design a procedure analogous to the one above that permits us
to tune stardom (s) and randomness (p) independently, while having a constant degree
sum in the graph (s D + (n − s)d = nm). To that end, locate the n individuals on the
circle. Take an even d ≤ m − 2, and sequentially pick s nodes at random to form S.
First the stars are taken care of: for each i ∈ S create an even D = (nm − (n − s)d)/s
links. With probability 1 − p, each of the D links is connected to one of the D/2
nearest nodes on each side of i on the circle. With probability p, it is connected at
random. That takes care of the stars and creates also some links for the non stars.
Then run across all the non stars and proceed analogously, checking that the degree
constraint for non stars is also satisfied. Because only integer numbers are handled
the procedure will in general not create exactly nm links. However the results will be
reasonably close to that target. The 3-panel graph below summarises a few statistics
for an illustration with n = 500, d = 6 and and m = 10, i.e. a degree sum of 5,000
which the algorithm roughly preserves. The sum is displayed in the insert in the upper
panel of Fig. 1. The concentration of links (upper panel) falls monotonically with s,
across all p values. The two lower panels of Fig. 1 show clustering and path length
versus p for s = 21, 107 and 500 stars. Clustering displays no significant variation
with s, while displaying its usual pattern with p. Distance also behaves monotonically
with degree, while the effect of s (owing to the assumption of a constant degree sum)
is monotonic and quite obvious. The algorithm thus behaves well and will permit us
to explore independently the effects of degree asymmetry and local disorder.
2.2 The dynamics of ideas
Over time, as ideas are exchanged, knowledge evolves. an agent’s knowledge stock
never shrinks, as we assume that ideas display non-rivalry (i does not lose his idea by
letting j have it), thus one agent’s knowledge only increases or stays constant as times
passes.
2.2.1 Knowledge as sets
Agents operate in a system (an industry) where there is a finite number of existing
ideas indexed by l = 1, . . . , . Each agent is endowed with a subset of these ideas,
and we denote Hi ⊆ {1, . . . , } the set of ideas held by i . Agents use ideas for the
sake of production, and in that respect agents are heterogenous.
Production is done by agent i according to the Leontieff production function
φi =
{
1 if Pi ⊆ Hi ,
0 otherwise, (1)
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Fig. 1 Characteristics of the graph family: asymmetry in the degree distribution as measured by the
Herfindahl concentration index (upper panel, pooled data across p, the whiskers are the minimum and
maximum values), degree sum (insert in upper panel, pooled across p), clustering coefficient (lower left
panel) and characteristic path length (lower right panel) for different numbers of stars
where Pi ⊆ {1, . . . , } is the set of ideas agent i needs to produce. Production is
impossible if even one l ∈ Pi /∈ Hi . As initial endowments are random, it will
typically be the case that Pi ⊆ Hi , so there is room for exchange.
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Consider now j ∈ Vi (equivalently i ∈ Vj , as the graph is non-directed). Denote
now Ni = {l ∈ Pi − Hi } the set of ideas that i uses in production but does not have,
that is, i’s needs. Then i is interested in j provided j has at least an idea that i uses
but does not have (that is, if Ni ∩ Hj = {∅}).
2.2.2 Exchange
As for the “terms of trade”, a number of possibilities can be simply explored in the
model presented above. Suppose the sequence of events is that each time period an
agent is selected and engages in knowledge exchange with one of his neighbours j .
In a gift transaction, upon request from i, j provides him with an element of Ni ∩ Hj
and asks nothing in return. This captures a situation in which agents tell each other
freely, creating knowledge spillovers. In a barter transaction, upon request from i, and
provided i has an idea that j needs (N j ∩ Hi = {∅}), an idea is exchanged for another
one. This is a trading situation, in which all ideas have a common price, yielding a
one-to-one exchange rate. In a mixed economy, some agents give while some trade.
This is controlled by 0 ≤ π ≤ 1 the share of knowledge givers. It is important to note
that agents are not interested in all the pieces of knowledge but only in those relevant
to their production activity. This implies that at some point trading can stop without
every agent holding every idea.
3 Numerical experiment





the proportion of individuals who actually produce. As in this simple environment any
agent either achieves production or does not, the φs consist of a collection of 0s and
1s and the variance in output is equal to φ(1 − φ) , which is largest when φ = 1/2
and smallest when φ is either 0 or 1.
The settings of the experiment are the following: a population of n = 600 agents
and m = 10 links per agents (hence a total of 6,000 edges); each agent is endowed
with a set of ideas that is randomly initialised by making each idea l available to i
with probability Pr{l ∈ Hi } = q. The production function is a 200 category one,
with agents needing on average 20 ideas to produce. Which ideas an agent needs is
determined randomly, independently of all other agents: Pr{l ∈ Pi } = θ = 0.1. All
probabilities used to create initial knowledge endowments and production technologies
are independent from each other. Each period in the simulation, one agents is selected,
he activates a connection and they trade if possible. This process continues until all
possible trades have been made. To examine the space of graphs, using the algorithm
described in Sect. 2.1 above, we vary the rewiring probability p from 0.001 to 1. For
each p value, ten different graphs are created and on each graph a single history is
run, until all exchange possibilities are exhausted.
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The parameters are p, the degree of disorder; s, the number of stars (with lower
s values corresponding to more asymmetry in the link distribution, see Fig. 1) and π
the share of agents who give rather than trade.
4 Results
In this section we present the results of our experiment. As will be seen, they connect
well to some of the empirical results described in the introduction.6 We start by exa-
mining performance at the aggregate level before turning to firm performance. Results
are presented under two initial conditions: one of scarcity, wherein initially any agent
holds only 15% (q = 0.15) of all possible knowledge; and one of abundance, wherein
an agent initially holds 85% (q = 0.85).
4.1 Effect of the density of traders
In the presentation of results, we suppress one parameter. The effect of the proportion π
of agents who give rather than trade is monotonic throughout. As the number of givers
increases, total knowledge levels, or equivalently the number of agents producing,
increases for all levels of asymmetry in the degree distribution and for all values of
randomness in the network. The cause is clear. The absence of a quid pro quo in
exchange when givers are involved implies that when there are many of them more
exchanges will take place, and so a larger proportion of firms will find the knowledge
they need. In some of the other results which we discuss below, the number of traders
changes the strength of the effects we observe, but in every case the direction of the
effects remains unchanged. We thus set the proportion, π , of agents who give to 5%,
which permits these agents to have a moderate influence on the diffusion dynamics,
without swamping other effects.
In the figures below we present shaded contour plots wherein darker shades of grey
indicate higher values of the variable being examined. The axes in each plot are p, the
degree of randomness in network structure, and the Herfindahl concentration index,
as a measure of asymmetry in the link distribution. In each figure there are two panels:
the left panel shows data from the case of scarce knowledge in the initial condition;
the right panel corresponds to the case of abundance.
4.2 Industry production
A measure of industry performance is the proportion φ of firms that have been able
to acquire the knowledge they need to produce. We refer to these as producers, and
to those that have not acquired the requisite knowledge as non-producers. The rela-
tionship between aggregate efficiency, the degree of randomness p and asymmetry,
6 We do not explicitly test the results against empirical data. One possible route to confront the model
would be that described by Werker and Brenner (2004).
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Fig. 2 Proportion of firms producing, with scarce knowledge (left panel) and abundant knowledge (right
panel)
is shown in Fig. 2a, b. The first effect, comparing the two panels, is that not sur-
prisingly, when knowledge is abundant more firms are able to produce. The second
effect concerns the number of stars, or asymmetry of the link distribution. When
knowledge is abundant, as asymmetry increases (or the number of stars falls) effi-
ciency decreases monotonically in a very clear pattern. This is explained as follows.
Increasing asymmetry means that links become more concentrated on fewer indivi-
duals. If there is a trading agent who has many links, his need for a quid pro quo
can block many trades, and close paths between many pairs of agents. At the same
time an agent with many links can quickly find the knowledge he needs. At this
point, needing nothing, he has no reason to trade, and so withdraws, thereby closing
many paths. This possibility can result in many agents not finding the knowledge they
need. Clearly this possibility recedes when there are fewer agents dominating the lin-
ked distribution. When knowledge is scare, the pattern is not monotonic: efficiency
increases and then decreases as asymmetry increases, with the peak at about 400
stars. When asymmetry is at its minimum, however (when every agent is a “star”),
efficiency is still much higher than when asymmetry is at its maximum (21 stars).
The overall decrease in efficiency has the same explanation as in the previous case.
The non-monotonicity of the relationship is explained, however, by a second effect,
namely path length. The possibility that knowledge transmission is blocked as
explained above, increases with the path length between sender and ultimate recei-
ver. Thus shorter paths reduce this effect, all else equal. Increasing asymmetry thus
has two effects working in opposite directions: decreasing path lengths, and concen-
trating links in a few agents. At an intermediate degree of asymmetry, efficiency is
maximised.
It is possible to observe an effect of p in Fig. 2, though it is of smaller magnitude
than the effect of s. Recall that increasing p increases the presence of structural holes,
and by the same mechanisms decreases both clustering and path length. What we
observe is that when knowledge is scarce, efficiency increases with p; when know-
ledge is abundant, efficiency decreases with p. In the former case, at the aggregate
level social capital is less valuable than are structural holes. Rapid access to distant
parts of the network is highly valuable in acquiring knowledge, and at the aggregate
level, short path lengths imply complete diffusion of knowledge. In the latter case,
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Fig. 3 Difference in degree between producers and non-producers
with relatively high probability the needed knowledge is close in network space, so a
clustered neighbourhood will imply many paths between agents that hold reciprocally
desirable knowledge.
4.3 Individual performance
It is less straightforward to examine performance at the micro level as the performance
of a firm must be compared to that of other firms in the same context. We are interested
here in the effect of the structure of a firm’s ego network on its performance.
At the end of each run in our simulation experiments, firms can be partitioned into
two groups: those who have accumulated the knowledge they need to produce, and
those who have not. The obvious question is whether these two groups are different
from each other along interesting network dimensions. We answer this by looking at
two structural parameters of each agent’s ego network: degree and clustering.
In Fig. 3 we show the difference in degree between producers and non-producers,
averaged over runs at each point in the parameter space. The figure shows that in terms
of acquiring useful knowledge, it is valuable to have many connections—the difference
in degree between producers and non-producers is always positive. When knowledge
is scare, this difference is much larger than when knowledge is abundant.7 In the
former case, essentially only stars, having many connections, are able to produce; in
the latter, many non-stars are also able to produce. This explains the magnitude of
this difference. An agent with many connections rapidly acquires the knowledge he
needs, at which point he withdraws from the system (completely if he is a trader,
partially if he is a giver). In the worst case this disconnects the network, in the best
case it makes path lengths longer. This can make it impossible for other agents to
acquire the knowledge they need. This effect is severe when knowledge is scarce,
much less so when knowledge is abundant since many agents will be able to produce
from the initial period, and those who cannot are likely to need only a few pieces,
which are relatively easy to find. The two structural parameters, asymmetry of the link
distribution and randomness of the network both have visible effects when knowledge
7 In both cases all observed differences in means are statistically significant at the 5% level or higher.
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Fig. 4 Difference in clustering between producers and non-producers
is common. The value of having many connections increases both as the randomness
of the network increases and as asymmetry in the link distribution increases. The latter
effect is driven largely by the fact that stars are more likely to produce than non-stars,
and as asymmetry increases, stars have more neighbours. The effect of p is driven by
clustering. In a barter economy, a clustered graph can alleviate the double coincidence
of wants problem, because a transitive triple provides a short path over which two
agents can make an indirect trade if they cannot trade directly. Thus agents with few
connections can take advantage of indirect connections to get the knowledge they need.
When there are few transitive triples, it is very difficult to overcome a failed double
coincidence of wants, so there is a large advantage to having many potential partners,
since when trade becomes impossible with one of my neighbours, I can simply turn
to another.
Is having a clustered ego network valuable for an agent? Figure 4 shows the dif-
ference in ego-network clustering between those who produce and those who do not,
averaged over runs at each point in the parameter space. This difference is always
negative—a clustered ego-network is bad for information gathering. However, the dif-
ference is roughly an order of magnitude larger when knowledge is rare than when it
is common.
This is consistent with the structural holes argument given above. Access to know-
ledge is vital in this economy, and in a clustered neighbourhood, links increase local
density rather than connect to distant parts of the network. If an agent is part of a
cluster he will, in general, have long path lengths to other agents. If there is a piece of
knowledge in a distant part of the network that the agent needs, the longer the path to
it, the more likely that on that path is a trader who, because he has all the knowledge he
needs, has effectively stopped participating in knowledge transactions. Second, as the
networks become less clustered, the negative value to an individual of being in a clus-
tered neighbourhood also decreases, becoming statistically insignificant when there
are no explicit stars. As the network itself is less clustered, the average distance from
a particular agent to others in the economy falls, regardless of the extent of clustering
in his ego network. This provides another route by which the effect just described is
attenuated. The effects seen in these figures are largely driven by the probability that
there is a failure in the path between an firm and the knowledge it needs, but when
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Fig. 5 Difference in performance between givers and traders
knowledge is abundant in general, these failure probabilities will be lower in general,
and so the effects weaker.
4.4 Givers and traders
Figure 5 shows the difference in performance between givers and traders, measured
as the difference between the proportion of traders who produce and the proportion of
givers who produce. Traders always fare better, and the extent to which this is the case
decreases with the asymmetry of the link distribution when knowledge is scarce, again
explained by the dominance of stars among the producers. The explanation for the
superior performance of traders generally lies in the nature of knowledge interactions.
If a trader is involved in an interaction he always receives desirable knowledge. If a
giver is involved in a transaction, he only receives information if he is the originator
of the transaction. Thus the knowledge of traders grows faster than that of givers, so
more of them will be able to produce in the long run.
4.5 Particular neighbours
In the structure of the model there are two types of agents that might have a significant
impact on the performance of agents in their neighbourhoods: stars and givers. The
effect of having a direct link to a giver is shown in Fig. 6. An agent has in his neigh-
bourhood a proportion of givers. In these panels we display the data over the same
range. We take the average difference in these proportions between producers and
non-producers. In the left panel of Fig. 6 the data take values only in [−0.01,+0.01],
but are not statistically different from zero, whereas in the right panel all values are
above 0.02, and are statistically significant. When knowledge is scarce, having a
giving neighbour has no effect; when knowledge is abundant, being close to a giver
significantly improves performance.
The effect of having a direct link to a star is shown in Fig. 7 using the same measure
as above in Fig. 6. In both panels of Fig. 7 the data are significantly negative. Having
a star as a friend is never a good thing as it is almost always a star who creates the
hold-up problem by exiting from the trading process. When there are few stars, each
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Fig. 7 Difference between the proportion of stars in the ego-network of producers and non-producers
having high degree, the problem is strongest. The pattern in both panels essentially
tracks the asymmetry of the degree distribution.
5 Conclusions
We have observed in these results that the presence of “givers” in the economy is
generally a good thing. This is intuitively appealing in the first instance, as it seems
natural that if agents are giving knowledge away, knowledge flows will be facilitated.
Traders function differently. In a networked economy, goods and services, including
knowledge flow from one agent to another through a path of intermediate agents.
At each step in the path some transaction is made. If it involves a trader, then the
transaction must benefit both parties. Thus if one agent on a path is no longer interested
in exchange, in our case, because a trader has all the information he needs and so no
longer makes trades, this eliminates any paths which flow through that agent. Thus
the model illustrates that a network with a skewed link distribution, having a few
stars, can be either good or bad. If the stars are givers, then their knowledge can flow
rapidly out to their many partners, and from there to the rest of the economy. This
will continue through the life of the economy. If the stars are traders, because they
have many partners, they will rapidly acquire all the knowledge they need, and so stop
trading. This blocks many paths between agents, and in the most extreme case, can
disconnect the network.
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In the introduction we discussed briefly the debate between the structural hole
position and the social capital view. On the former, a non-clustered ego-network is
good for a firm; on the latter, a densely interconnected neighbourhood provides a
good knowledge environment. The model developed here permits some formalization
of the resolution suggested by Rowley et al. (2000). In Sect. 4.2 we showed that
when knowledge was scarce, aggregate production increased with p, whereas when it
was abundant, aggregate production decreased with p. Average clustering decreases
monotonically with p. Thus when knowledge is scarce a network with structural
holes performs well; when knowledge is abundant a network with high social capital
performs well. A situation of scarce knowledge represents a young industry, in which
technologies are new, and firms are exploring the technological space to find and create
the best possible variant of their products and processes. For any firm, the necessary
knowledge is difficult to find, and may reside in distant parts of the economy. Here,
redundant links will be less valuable than links that create short paths to other agents.
A situation of abundant knowledge may represent a more mature industry. A dominant
design has emerged; most firms know what it is, and have most of the knowledge
needed to execute it. What is happening is that firms are exploiting their versions of
the dominant design, and need details rather than new principles. Here, distant parts
of the economy will have similar knowledge roughly speaking to local parts of the
economy, and what is necessary is to extract the final details. Here, non-redundant
links lose their advantage and we see the force of the social capital argument.
One thing that is striking in this regard is that the economy and individual firms have
different responses to clustering when knowledge is abundant. At the aggregate level, to
recall, when knowledge is abundant output rises as clustering increases, particularly
when there are many traders. But at the individual level, being part of a cluster is
almost always bad (those who produce have on average less clustered ego-networks
than those who do not).8 The explanation may lie in the fact that when a network
is highly clustered on average, a firm with low clustering can connect different parts
of the network. If it is the case that firms within a cluster develop similarities, then
a firm between two clusters can have access to two different types of knowledge.
This provides it with an advantage in terms of finding the knowledge it requires. This
appears to be so in our model even though there is no strategic knowledge acquisition
or control. It has been suggested by Burt (1992), and also by Baum et al. (2003),
that firms that fill structural holes in the network can control information flows. In
our model there is no notion of controlling flows, but we do see the first necessary
condition for such control, namely access to different knowledge pools.
Efficient knowledge diffusion is the hallmark of a healthy modern economy. What
the model developed here shows is that the structures necessary to promote know-
ledge diffusion depend to a very great extent on the details of the industry. Industries
or episodes dominated by collective invention, in which knowledge is (locally) freely
given, are very different from industries in which knowledge trading is the norm. But
further, how they differ depends on whether knowledge is scarce, as in a newly emer-
ging industry, or abundant, in a mature industry. When knowledge is scare, random
8 This is obviously a very rough generalization. Exceptions exist, particularly when there are many givers
in the economy, or when there are no stars.
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networks always perform well. When knowledge is abundant, and knowledge trading
dominates, clustered networks perform best from the social point of view.
Is there a role for policy here? When knowledge is scarce, socially, random,
unclustered networks perform well. This performance carries over to the individual
firm level: firms with non-clustered ego networks also perform well. So we observe a
coincidence between network structures that are socially and individually desirable.
The coincidence disappears, though, when knowledge is abundant. Socially clustered
networks are efficient, but any firm would prefer a non-clustered ego-network—one
abundant in structural holes. Here, this divergence between social and private effi-
ciency provides scope for intervention in network formation, at least in principle.
What this model has shown though, is that policy-making in this area is a very delicate
business—one size definitely does not fit all. The details about the state of knowledge
and the social conventions regarding exchange matter a lot, and so in this area policy
must be built on a very strong empirical foundation.
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